Chapter 20
Re-conquests, 1667-69

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No sooner did the news of Shivaji’s captivity after the sensational scene at the durbar reach the Deccan than the great officers, whom Shivaji had appointed as the high stewards of his kingdom during his absence, began to make retaliatory invasions of Mogul territory in the southern subhas. The announcement of Shivaji’s escape and presently his safe return put new life into the Maratha campaigns. The English factors at Karwar made a correct forecast in one of their letters of the time: “If it be true that Shivaji hath escaped, Aurangzeb will quickly hear of him to his sorrow.” How correct this forecast was, was soon proved by the events that followed.

Before Shivaji’s return to the scene of his Deccan triumphs, the Bijapur and the Mogul arms had been pitted against one another in a decisive campaign very much to the disadvantage of the latter. Jay Singh laid siege to Bijapur. The Deccan light horse under the Adil Shahi government had resumed those century-old tactics that had saved the capital from many a blustering conqueror. The Adil Shahi troops hovered round the Mogul camp and cut off all its supply of corn and fodder. A season of drought added the miseries of thirst to those of famine. To crown these difficulties an auxiliary force from the sultan of Golconda came opportunely to the aid of his oppressed neighbour of Bijapur, while Jay Singh’s petitions for reinforcements to his imperial sovereign might as well have been addressed to the wind. It is clear that the suspicious mind of the emperor exaggerated the
danger of the good understanding subsisting between Shivaji and Jay Singh; and he seems to have been the victim of a fancy that Jay Singh was going to make himself more powerful than was consistent with loyalty, and that with Shivaji’s aid he would presently defy the armies of the empire. While the emperor continued in this attitude of studied indifference, Jay Singh himself began to conclude that it was a thankless task to sacrifice the lives of his gallant Rajput veterans only to Court an inglorious defeat by the Bijapur forces, which indeed was inevitable in view of the attitude of indifference adopted by the emperor. He began, therefore, of set purpose to withdraw his armies from the invaded country. The forces gradually retreated in the direction of Aurangabad. The enemy gave chase. But the gallant Rajput succeeded in making good his retreat to the Mogul head-quarters in the Deccan.

Jay Singh indeed found his resources both of men and money so exhausted that he had scarcely enough forces at his command to garrison the fortresses ceded to him by Shivaji as also those which he had succeeded in capturing with Shivaji’s aid and assistance. Nor had he sufficient balances in his military chest for the maintenance of these mountain garrisons. He had to eke out his resources with the utmost caution and prudence, maintaining large garrisons upon only the principal hill-forts such as Lohagad, Sinhagad and Purandar in the ghat country and Mahuli and Karnala in the Konkan. In these five forts large forces were maintained, with a sufficient supply of war-material. In other places, where there was a possibility of obtaining local supplies of food and fodder, moderate garrisons were stationed. But as regards the greater number of other fortresses, as he could afford neither men nor money for their maintenance, he withdrew his garrisons demolishing the gates and defences of the fortresses and leaving no necessity for any garrison at all. Having thus made the best of his scanty resources and secured his conquests as best he might, he calmly awaited orders at Aurangabad. He was at last recalled by his ungracious sovereign, and Jaswant Singh and Prince Muazzim (Mauzam) were jointly appointed governors of the Deccan. It is sad to chronicle the death of this noble and magnanimous prince. On his march to North India after his recall the gallant Rajput was taken ill and died.

Meanwhile Moropant Pingle, the minister of Shivaji, occupied fortress after fortress as it was evacuated by the Mogul armies and, arranging for such improvised defence works as were practicable at the moment, re-established the Maratha rule round about. When just a small force of Mogul troops still remained in garrison, Moropant defeated and expelled the occupants and re-garrisoned the fortresses with Maratha troops. This he did with fort after fort
with the gratifying result that already before Shivaji’s arrival in the south, many of the ceded forts were already flying the Maratha flag. On Shivaji’s arrival he lost no time in recovering the entire district of the Konkan.

The final failure of the great armies sent down with Jay Singh and Diler Khan, the capture and subsequent escape of Shivaji, the junction of the military resources of Golconda with those of Bijapur, and the accession of strength they were likely to gain from the possibility of Shivaji’s throwing in the weight of his immense resources on their side showed how seriously imperilled was the Mogul cause in the south, and the magnitude of the interests at stake was sufficient to have induced the emperor himself to gird on his armor and take upon himself the supreme command of the new army of invasion. But there were disturbances on the northern frontier which obliged the emperor to remain at the capital. He had his own misgivings at having mismanaged things so as to force Shivaji into a bitter hostility with the empire, and he was now placed in an unfortunate dilemma with regard to the course he should pursue. Were he to entrust the command of a very considerable army to his son or to the Raja Jaswant Singh, and with all these armaments at their command should they be beaten, the prestige of the empire which was now at stake would be lost forever. If on the other hand the prince triumphed over his enemies and found himself at the head of a large army, he might perhaps be so much flushed with his victory as to forget the allegiance due to his father and raise the flag of revolt. In view of these misgivings the emperor deemed it prudent not to commit himself to a special campaign against Shivaji, who on his part was the last person to fail to turn to his utmost advantage the opportunities presented to him by the procrastination and mistrustful character of the emperor.

In many respects the appointment of Prince Muazzim and the Raja Jaswant Singh to the satrapy of the Deccan was favourable to Shivaji’s wishes. He had cultivated the friendship of Jaswant Singh during his enforced sojourn at Agra. The Raja was a Rajput prince of a haughty character and had much of that religious pride which is rarely absent in a noble-spirited Rajput. When Aurangzeb entered on a rebellious war against his father to secure his succession to the throne, Jaswant Singh at first opposed his wicked ambition. It was only when it seemed clear that victory would at last smile on the rebel prince that he turned round to his side. He was naturally never in the closest confidence of the emperor. His greatest weakness was avarice, and Shivaji turned it to very good account. Well did Shivaji call him a calf with a fondness for the oil-cake of a bribe. And Shivaji managed him so well by taking advantage of this weakness, that he always played the tune which was agreeable to the Maratha leader. The Mogul prince was a magnanimous and high-spirited general. He had nothing of his father’s distrustfulness in his
disposition. An open hand and a love of luxury were the distinguishing traits of his character. He was a fickle-minded young man, and the slightest persuasion turned him from his purposes. Upon such a plastic mind Jaswant Singh exercised a considerable influence. He scarcely, if ever, deliberately crossed his wishes. On his departure for the south Aurangzeb had given him much wholesome advice. He had warned him not to try conclusions with Shivaji. He would be no match for the Maratha in diplomacy or intrigue. He had been the ruin of many a general. A fresh discomfiture at his hands would recoil on the Mogul state with the most grievous results. He thus advised him to aim at conciliation in his dealings with the Marathas, to please them and so to save the Mogul fortunes from their interference. This advice was addressed to ears that were naturally willing and sympathetic. The prince had never approved of Aurangzeb’s futile attempt to entrap Shivaji. It was his conviction that the highest interests of the empire required that Shivaji should be treated as a valiant and enterprising feudatory of the empire.

There is a tradition that when the intelligence came that the prince was marching to the south, Shivaji, disguised as a poor peasant, overtook him at a village near Brahma-puri and presented to him a pot of curds, which was accepted by the prince on account of its exquisite flavour and ordered to be served to him at table. A little pellet of wax, says the story, was found in the midst of the curds, and it was found that a little note was rolled up in the wax. The note purported to say that Shivaji had resorted to this expedient that he might be able to see with his own eyes what manner of man was the noble prince who was entrusted with the war against himself. If there is any truth in this story, we can well judge what reflections must have been roused in the prince’s mind about the enterprise and daring of the author of this curiously presented epistle. He must have been convinced of the great hazard of war with a general of such inventiveness and enterprise. On his arrival at Aurangabad negotiations for a peace were opened through Jaswant Singh. The latter had already been bribed. Shivaji was thus able to shape a treaty according to his wishes. The time was not yet ripe for a complete break with the Moguls, and a conciliatory attitude towards a magnanimous prince like Muazzim might be productive of future results. Upon the conciliatory proposal of Muazzim, therefore, Shivaji sent his private secretary, Balaji Avji Chitnis, as an envoy extraordinary to wait upon Muazzim at the Mogul camp, with special instructions to find out the prince’s real intentions. According to court etiquette, presents of jewels, brocades, and elephants accompanied the envoy. On Jaswant Singh introducing Chitnis to the prince, he began with the preamble of the treaty between Jay Singh and Shivaji, as a consequence of which Shivaji had gone up to Agra for the favour of a personal audience with the emperor. After the personal interview, proceeded the envoy, it was
Shivaji’s intention to get imperial ratification of certain clauses of the treaty and take service under the emperor, but that in spite of the mediation of sardars like Jay Singh, Ram Singh and others the emperor had distrusted the whole thing and put him under arrest. This, submitted the envoy, could not be said to have been done with a good grace. The prince protested that the emperor neither had then, nor now, any evil intention against Shivaji. The emperor’s sole motive had always been that there should be thorough cordiality between himself and Shivaji and that the latter should seal this friendship by immediately enlisting in the service of the empire. As Shivaji had not approved of the emperor’s arrangement, the latter had proceeded to obtain his consent by force and therefore kept him under restraint. Shivaji had not appreciated the kind intentions of the emperor and had affected his escape and come down to the Deccan. The prince then explained that on his setting out for the Deccan he had received special injunctions from his father not to enter upon any hostilities with Shivaji, of whose extraordinary ability he was perfectly assured. The emperor had told Muazzim that his own attempts to pacify Shivaji had unfortunately taken an untoward course. Shivaji had shown he had no desire to live at Agra, but would live only in his Deccan home. So far, so good. What the emperor now wanted was to ratify the former treaty and to enlist Shivaji’s services in the Mogul campaigns in the south. Had the emperor indeed, continued Prince Muazzim, any hostile purposes against Shivaji, he would certainly have prosecuted his designs when the Maratha leader was at Agra. Such being the case, Muazzim wanted to know Shivaji’s real opinion upon this proposal.

Upon the report of this conversation being duly submitted by Chitnis to Shivaji, the latter signified his wishes for a treaty, when the following conditions were mutually approved of between the two parties: - (1) that there should in future be mutual peace and friendship; (2) that the former treaty be ratified; (3) that unless and until all mutual distrust was clearly swept away, Shivaji should send no forces to co-operate with the Moguls, and till then there should be no friendly intercourse; (4) that on cession of territory being duly made for the maintenance of his auxiliaries, Shivaji should furnish a contingent of 5000 to co-operate with the Moguls; (5) that the talukas of Avdhe and Balapur in the Berars be ceded in jahgir to Sambhaji for the maintenance of his mansab of 5000 horses in the Mogul service as provided for in the last treaty; (6) that Shivaji should have full power to levy the chauth and sirdeshmukhi contributions as asked for in the last treaty; and (7) the fortresses and territories of the Nizamshahi and Adil Shahi states now in the
possession of Shivaji should continue to be in his possession. Upon the draft setting forth these conditions the Mogul prince affixed his signature and told Shivaji to prepare as a matter of conventional form the draft treaty in the form of a petition to the emperor, upon which he would forward it to him with a personal recommendation for its acceptance. This was done and the prince added to it his warm recommendation that the present offer of such a valiant warrior as Shivaji should be accepted by the government and the bonds of friendship drawn closely together (March, 1668). It was convenient to Aurangzeb to accede to this request and the treaty was duly ratified. The title of Raja was conferred upon Shivaji, the mansab conferred upon Sambhaji was confirmed, and the jahgir described in the treaty sanctioned, the proper sanads for the same being sent down by the emperor.

The management of the revenue of this jahgir was entrusted to a Brahman revenue clerk, named Ravji Somnath who was promoted to the rank of mokasdar and sent up with proper equipment. Sambhaji presented himself at Aurangabad as a mansabdar in the imperial army, with his 5000 horses, attended by the experienced commander, Prataprao Guzar. The Mogul prince received him with due honour for his rank and assigned to him an independent place for his residence, which became quite a new ward of the town. As Sambhaji was quite a stripling he was soon permitted to return, and Prataprao remained in the Mogul camp in command of Sambhaji’s contingent. Shivaji himself managed to avoid the servile position of a mansabdar in the imperial army.

By this friendly peace, Shivaji again recovered possession of the districts of Poona and Supa and most of the other territory lost under the first treaty. However the important forts of Purandar and Sinhagad still remained with the Moguls. In offering such conciliatory terms, the emperor’s plan was gradually to entice Shivaji to the position of a dependent and so to lure him on inevitably to his final destruction. But Prince Muazzim had no such sinister designs. His liberality and purity of motives were incapable of any baseness or double dealing.

It is even affirmed that some years later Muazzim, weary of the emperor’s perpetual distrust and duplicity, was prepared to rebel from his father and invited the assistance of Shivaji. Suspecting some stratagem, the

1. According to Chitnis’s chronicle the twenty-seven forts ceded under the first treaty had to be ceded over again to the Moguls.
2. Rajwade, VIII, 17.
3. This occurred in October, 1667. (Jedhe Chronology, p.188).
Maratha chief warily replied that in case of a serious conflict between the prince and the emperor he would be glad to join him with an army at the out-break of hostilities. With a view to assure Shivaji of his seriousness and to dispel his suspicions, the prince suddenly marched with his army to the north and sent urgent messages to Shivaji for instant help, employing an officer of high rank upon this embassy so as to impress him all the more with the earnestness of his request. Shivaji sent word in reply that while the prince was fighting in the north, he would watch and defend his interest in the south, that this would be the best plan under the circumstances, as Muazzim had an army large enough to encounter the emperor; and should fortune frown upon his attempt he invited the prince to come and partake of the hospitality of his dominions. Muazzim tried once more to tempt him by offering to place his army under Shivaji’s command. But the latter was too prudent a man to yield to such an allurement. Despairing of Shivaji’s support, the prince gave up his chimerical project and having by his abject repentance obtained the emperor’s pardon, he returned to the Mogul head-quarters at Aurangabad. But true to his magnanimous nature, he harboured no grudge whatever against Shivaji for his prudent refusal to join him in his rebellious folly. The event served only to draw closer the bonds of their mutual friendship and good opinion.4

In his despatches to the prince, Aurangzeb advised him to encourage Shivaji to continue his invasions of the Bijapur and Golconda territories, so that the Deccan monarchies with their foundations undermined by these repeated onslaughts might fall easy victims before the Mogul invaders. Part of the territory thus captured by Shivaji was to be ceded to him for the maintenance of his armies. Following these orders Shivaji made repeated descents upon the Deccan kingdoms. When the Bijapur government saw how they were caught between two fires and how the invasions of Shivaji were parts of a general policy prosecuted with the co-operation of the imperial armies, they determined to make their peace with the Moguls, which they did at the price of the cession of the fort of Sholapur and the territory adjoining to it, yielding an annual revenue of eighteen thousand pagodas. Upon receiving

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4. Catrou (Manuoci) tells the story of a mock rebellion of Prince Muazzim got up under Aurangzeb’s special order, for the triple purpose of deceiving Shivaji, testing the good faith of the Mogul commanders, and discrediting Muazzim in case he should at a later date seriously think of rebelling against his father. Prof. Sarkar (Shivaji p. 212-219) shows that this event, which at one of its phases threatened to wear the aspect of a civil war between Muazzim and the emperor, was due to a quarrel between he prince and Diler Khan who had been despatched in 1670 to co-operate with the former in the prosecution of the war with Shivaji. On this occasion Muazzim and Jaswant Singh pursued Diler Khan into Khandesh against the wishes of the local governor, and invited Shivaji (with whom they carried on a pretended war) to help them in the pursuit.
intelligence of this treaty Shivaji had a private conference with Muazzim and Jaswant Singh at which he got them to consent to connive at any expedition he might conduct on his own account in the territories of Bijapur and Golconda. With this permission Shivaji embarked on a vigorous campaign to levy the chauth and sirdeshmukhi contributions throughout the Adil Shahi dominions, until helpless before these depredations and with a view to purchase peace and security at any price, the tired ministers of the Adil Shahi state agreed for a second time in the history of their dealings with Shivaji to pay him an annual tribute of three lakhs of rupees, a sum which some chroniclers raise to seven lakhs. This second treaty with Shivaji like the first was a private understanding. It would have served no useful purpose to give out the fact that a Mahomedan state was actually reduced to the condition of paying tribute to a Hindu chief and of living as it were on his sufferance. The haughty nobility at the Mahomedan capital would have reckoned it an unspeakable disgrace to their manhood, and by an unreasonable and impotent outcry would have added to the embarrassments of the government. The secret treaty was however approved of by the sultan, who now retained Shivaji’s ambassador to reside at his court. The ambassador thus nominated to this charge was Shamji Naik Pande.\(^5\)

Shivaji then turned his attention to the Golconda kingdom, making the same predatory incursions into every province of that state. The sultan of the state scarcely possessed the resources to resist successfully these repeated invasions, and the knowledge that Shivaji was acting on a secret understanding with the Moguls made him realize that any such resistance would be useless. The sultan was thus reduced to the arts of conciliation. His two ministers, Madanna and Akanna, advocated a peaceful policy. With their mediation a treaty was made with Shivaji, the Kutub Shahi chief agreeing to pay an annual tribute of five lakhs of rupees. Both parties were pledged to mutual friendship and alliance and the admission of embassies at their respective courts. The ambassador deputed by Shivaji under the operation of this treaty to reside at the court of Golconda was Nirajirao.\(^6\)

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5. Prof. Sarkar makes no mention of this treaty. He, however, quotes, from the Factory Records, Surat, to show that there were no acts of hostility between Shivaji and Bijapur (Prof. Sarkar’s Shivaji, pp. 20 and 315). The Jedhe Chronology p. 188 affirms that peace was made with Bijapur in May 1667. It states the name of the Maratha ambassador at Bijapur as Bawaji Naik Pande. Shamji Naik Pande also acted as Shivaji’s ambassador after the secret treaty with Abdul Mahomed, the chief minister of Bijapur, (Vide concluding portion of Chapter-13). Pande died at Satara in December 1675 (Jedhe p. 192).

6. Khafi Khan (Elliot, VII 286-87) says that on his return from Agra, Shivaji saw the Sultan Abdulla Kutub Shaha and formed an alliance with him, in virtue of which he undertook to conquer for Golconda from Bijapur some forts which the latter had wrested from the former.
Having reduced the two principal Deccan monarchies to the condition of tributaries, Shivaji turned his attention to the Konkan. Here the Abyssinians and the Portuguese still wielded considerable influence, which it was part of Shivaji’s policy to wipe away and so to bring the Konkan littoral under his undisputed power. With this view he fell suddenly upon Goa, resolved to expel the Portuguese from this province. He does not seem to have met with the success he had reckoned upon. The chronicles are silent upon these operations, lending countenance to the view that no great encounters took place. Shivaji then made a renewed effort for the conquest of Janjira, but with no greater success than on the former occasion. The Abyssinians were seriously handicapped in the operations against Shivaji and had to apply to the East India Company’s representatives at Bombay for help. Shivaji had to return without realizing his ambitious projects.

On the formation of the alliances with the Mogul, the Adil Shahi and the Kutub Shahi powers, as has already been described in the beginning of this chapter, peace reigned all over Shivaji’s dominions and he had leisure to devote himself to the organization of his kingdom. But the subject of the reconstruction of the country on Shivaji’s own lines may be held over for a later chapter (Chapter -24).

The alliances formed for the present with the Mahomedan powers naturally created an impression that Shivaji’s ambition was quenched and that he was now going to rest upon his oars, devoting his energies to the establishment of a regular administrative system in his dominions. For had he possessed the grit and the resources to try conclusions with the Mogul power, why should he court their present friendship at the cost of an implicit acknowledgment of their supremacy? Why observe such patience with the Mogul pro-consuls? Why keep them propitiated with a periodic interchange of presents and social amenities? Thus it is that Shivaji’s attitude must have struck the superficial observer. But the events that were yet in the womb of power. Some of these forts Shivaji gave up to Golconda and others he kept for himself. But some to the forts mentioned were obviously conquered later and Khafi Khan himself mentions a report that Shivaji first went to Hyderabad in the first or second year of the reign of Sultan Abdul Hassan, who came to the throne in 1672. Grant Duff bases his account of the treaties with Bijapur and Golconda on the Marathi chronicles and Scott’s Deccan. The Jedhe Chronology under date Jeshta, Shaka year 1594 (June 1672), states that Niraji Ravji made a treaty with Golconda which was to pay a tribute of one lakh of pagodas, of which he brought 66,000 to Shivaji (Jedhe, p. 190). It would seem to have been a fresh demand on the accession to the throne of a new sultan and is no argument against an earlier stipulation for tribute. At any rate about 1669 Niraji Ravji was at the Mogul headquarters at Aurangabad, along with Prataprao Guzar, and could not then have been Shivaji’s ambassador at the Golconda capital (Jedhe, p. 188).
time and had scarcely cast their shadow before them ought to help us to
understand that this was a delusion, and that the great Deccan warrior was but
resting awhile with eyes wide awake, giving to his exhausted countrymen a
necessary period of recuperation after all their triumphs and vicissitudes.
There was a risk at all times, and never more so than after what had happened
in the matter of the defeat of Jay Singh, that Bijapur and Golconda might
make common cause and turn a united front against a Hindu power that was
still in its birth-throes. To have the imperial assurance and an asylum in the
back-ground of all his political plans was, therefore, an indispensable weapon
in his defensive armoury. Shivaji could not count on that imperial assurance
to shield him in the prosecution of any extreme measures with the Deccan
monarchies. The fanaticism of the emperor would scarcely permit him to look
with stoical indifference upon an infidel pressing hard upon the kingdoms of
the faithful, and the moment it was discovered that it was no longer to the
advantage of the empire to connive at his ally’s forward movements, the
emperor’s wrath was sure to burst forth suddenly upon his nascent enterprise.
There was moreover a point beyond which the Maratha leader could not
proceed without coming into direct collision with the wishes of the emperor,
who for so many years had looked upon the domains of the Bijapur and
Golconda kingdoms as his own royal spoils and would scarcely permit a
partner in the chase to appropriate the trophies to himself. The time was not
yet for such an open defiance.

But the Maratha-Mogul entente was not destined to endure. The
distrustful emperor soon began to suspect that Shivaji’s present humility was
merely a cloak to cover his ambitious designs. He guessed that Shivaji had
managed by bribes and other arts to lead the imperial commanders to fall in
with his wishes. He, therefore, sent fresh orders, warning Prince Muazzim
against the perils of Shivaji’s political blandishments and his professions of
love and amity. He pointed out that Shivaji’s ambition soared far higher. He
was about to pounce upon the prostrate sultanates of the south, and presently
when he had disposed of them, he would launch an attack upon the central
power. It would then be too late to repel his invasions. He was presumptuous
enough, even as matters stood now, to turn to his own uses the revenues of
forts, towns and territories which he had won from the southern sultanates
with the active connivance of the Mogul generals, and never felt himself to be
under any obligation to account for these revenues. This was not as it ought to
be. The good relations established with him by treaty must now be broken off,
the forts and territories made over to him recovered, and the auxiliary
contingent sent by him discharged, and if such a splendid chance did indeed
present itself, that contingent should be surprised and Prataprao Guzar, Shivaji
himself and the other great commanders, who owned him allegiance, must be
apprehended, if possible. A reluctance to obey these orders, so the emperor plainly hinted, would bring down his displeasure upon his head. Before these dispatches were actually received, the prince got intelligence about their contents from his confidential spies and was able to inform Prataprao Guzar about it and advised him to ensure his safety by flight. That very night Prataprao left the Mogul camp at Aurangabad along with the cavalry contingent in his charge and accompanied by Niraji, Shivaji’s envoy at Aurangabad, reached Poona in safety (December 1669). On receipt of the imperial despatches, Prince Muazzim, to avert suspicion of any collusion, attempted a feigned pursuit of the retreating Marathas. The pursuers returned, as was anticipated, to their general, without achieving any success. The prince wrote in reply to his father’s despatches that the ungrateful traitors, the Marathas, had already left before receipt of the imperial firman, and in consequence could not be put under arrest, as he had been directed to do.

Shivaji was gratified at Prataprao’s safe return with all his party and the unmistakable proofs which he brought with him of the imperial prince’s esteem in the form of presents sent with every precaution for secrecy and concealment. Little did he regret the interruption of his peaceful relations with the great Mogul. He had spent two years in almost profound peace in looking after the internal organization of his kingdom. For two years without any overt warfare he had the satisfaction of supporting a not inconsiderable part of his forces at the cost of the Moguls. But now it was time again to be up and doing.

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7. The Bundela Memoirs give the version that the jahgir conferred upon Prince Sambhaji was revoked on the pretext of reimbursing the amount of one lakh of rupees which had been paid to Shivaji when he started from the Deccan for Delhi. When the news of the resumption of this jahgir reached Shivaji, he at once recalled Prataprao Guzar with his contingent; and his representatives in the jahgir districts likewise returned to the south, carrying off such booty as they could lay their hands upon. The text follows Sabhasad, 61-62 and Shedgavkar, p. 62.